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Pooling & Sharing: From Slow March 
to Quick March? 
Sven Biscop & Jo Coelmont 
On 23 May, the Ministers of Defence of the 
EU27  will  assess  the  first  outcome  of  the 
“Ghent Framework” for pooling & sharing 
of military capabilities. While some defence 
establishments may be hesitant, now is no 
time  for  timidity.  Ministers  must  take  the 
lead  for  the  process  to  yield  substantial 
results.  If  “Ghent”  was  the  expression  of 
the will, now the first concrete actions must 
be taken. 
2010 saw an arduous debate about whether, and 
if so, how to implement Permanent Structured 
Cooperation  (PESCO),  a  new  mechanism 
introduced  by  the  Lisbon  Treaty  that  could 
notably  make  capability  development  more 
efficient and coherent. In spite of the lack of 
common  understanding  of  PESCO,  the 
Ministers of Defence of the EU Member States, 
urged on by the financial crisis, on 9 December 
2010  agreed  on  potentially  far-reaching 
conclusions: the so-called Ghent Framework.  
 
Avoiding  any  explicit  reference  to  PESCO, 
Ministers  focused  on  the  immediate  need  for 
coordination in view of the budgetary cuts and 
proposed  a  concrete  method.  Member  States 
were encouraged to “systematically analyze their 
national  military  capabilities”,  aiming  at 
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“measures  to  increase  interoperability  for 
capabilities  to  be  maintained  on  a  national 
level;  exploring  which  capabilities  offer 
potential for pooling; intensifying cooperation 
regarding  capabilities,  support  structures  and 
tasks which could be addressed on the basis of 
role-  and  task-sharing”.  This  pragmatic 
approach  created  a  positive  atmosphere. 
Subsequently, “pooling & sharing” became the 
new buzzword in CSDP town.  
 
Keeping up the Pace  
Pooling & sharing is of course not new. For 
decades  already  many  Member  States  have 
pooled  important  capabilities  with  others, 
through  various  bilateral  and  multilateral 
arrangements, and some have even engaged in 
role  and  task  sharing  or  specialization.  But 
they have never surpassed the tactical level of 
project-by-project  cooperation,  and  have  not 
solved the strategic shortfalls. There certainly 
is  scope  therefore  to  create  many  more 
synergies  and  effects  of  scale,  as  well  as  an 
increasing necessity, in view of the budgetary 
pressure  and  the  ever  reduced  size  of  most 
Member  States’  defence  budgets  and  armed 
forces.  
 
The current window of opportunity is not to 
be  wasted.  However,  after  the  initial 
enthusiasm,  conservatism  might  yet  gain  the 
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upper  hand.  Defence  establishments  focusing 
on maintaining national structures and stepping 
on the brakes to protect what they have, risk to 
lose  the  chance  of  getting  more,  and  will 
probably end up with less. Of course, as several 
Member  States  have  indicated,  the  Ghent 
Framework has to be a long-term process, that 
continues  beyond  the  Hungarian  Presidency. 
But that requires a sufficiently strong impulse at 
the start of the process.   
 
Two important conclusions therefore must be 
kept in mind when the Ministers of Defence of 
the EU27 meet on 23 May:  
 
(1) If  the  first  round  of  the  Ghent  Framework  is 
inconclusive, there will be no second round. If the 
conclusion  of  the  May  Defence  Ministers 
Council  is  that  all  27  go  for  pooling  & 
sharing – but in some peripheral areas only, 
that will not change the face of European 
defence.  Vice  versa,  if  the 
conclusion is to go for pooling & 
sharing in all capability areas – but 
only  between  Belgium  and 
Luxembourg, that will not change 
the  face  of  European  defence 
either. A critical mass of Member 
States  must  take  ambitious 
initiatives,  including  in  some  significant 
capability areas, to set things in motion.  
 
(2) Pooling & sharing what you have, does not get you 
more.  Pooling  &  sharing  will  allow  us  to 
make  existing  capabilities  more  cost-
effective,  and  hopefully  also  more 
operationally  effective.  But  it  does  not 
automatically  lead  to  solutions  for  the 
capability shortfalls, i.e. the capabilities that 
collectively  we  don’t  have.  The  Ghent 
Framework not only has to be long-term, it 
also has to create a platform to launch new 
capability initiatives.  
 
For the Ghent Framework to yield results, it 
must  be  top-down.  Not  in  the  sense  that 
Brussels dictates to the Member States, but in 
the sense that the Ministers of Defence, who 
are the capability providers, personally take the 
lead  and  steer  their  armed  forces  towards 
greater  convergence  in  order  to  meet  the 
common capability objectives.  
 
A Permanent Platform 
Useful inspiration for dealing with commonly 
identified  objectives  can  be  found  in  the 
method  used  to  launch  CSDP  operations:  a 
Force  Generation  Conference.  Once  the 
capabilities  required  for  a  specific  upcoming 
CSDP operation are identified and listed in the 
Statement  of  Requirements,  a  Force 
Generation  Conference  is  organized  among 
the  potential  Troop  Contributing  Nations. 
This  process  goes  on  until  the  entire  list  of 
requirements  has  been  met  by  voluntary 
contributions by the Member States. Although 
such conferences can be difficult, in the end 
they have always yielded result.  
In a similar vein, the Ghent Framework could 
be  the  first  step  towards  a  “capability 
generation  conference”  of  the  Ministers  of 
Defence of the willing Member States. The aim 
of  such  a  conference  would  be  to  create  a 
durable  strategic-level  framework  for  systematic 
exchange of information on national defence 
planning, as a basis for consultation and top-
down  coordination,  on  a  voluntary  basis. 
Today,  Member  States  do  their  national 
defence planning in splendid isolation, without 
really taking into account either EU or NATO 
guidelines.  In  the  future,  a  national  defence 
white book ought no longer to be the end of 
the process, but the starting point for an open 
dialogue among partners. As defence planning 
concerns the long term, such a dialogue will be 
permanent,  hence  a  Permanent  Capability 
“The  Ghent  Framework  could  be 
the  first  step  towards  a  capability 
generation conference”   3 
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Conference. Such a forum will create the certainty 
and confidence that capitals need in order to 
really align their national defence planning with 
fellow Member States and to focus it on the 
commonly identified shortfalls.  
 
The  aim  is  not  in  any  way  to  transfer 
sovereignty over defence planning to the EU 
level.  National  governments  and  Chiefs  of 
Defence will still decide in which capabilities to 
invest  or  disinvest.  The  aim  is  to  restore  the 
sovereignty  that  each  individually  we  have  all 
lost,  being  unable  to  sustain  significant  crisis 
management  operations  on  our  own,  which 
pooling and sharing alone has not been able to 
remedy.  
 
Towards Military Convergence  
Only  in  the  framework  of  a  Permanent 
Capability Conference that provides them with 
a bird’s eye view of all participants’ plans and 
intentions can Member State reliably assess the 
relevance  of  their  national  capabilities.  It 
functions in effect as a peer review mechanism 
of  national  defence  planning.  The  advantages 
for national capability decisions are four-fold:  
 
(1) Member  States  can  confidently  choose  to 
strengthen  their  relevance  by  focusing  their 
defence effort on those capabilities required 
for crisis management operations that are in 
short supply and therefore critical at the EU 
level.  
 
(2) Member  States  can  safely  decide  not  to 
expand  or  even  to  disinvest  in  national 
capabilities of which at the EU-level there 
already  is  overcapacity.  Actually,  Member 
States spent far more money on maintaining 
redundant  capabilities  than  would  be 
needed  to  solve  the  priority  shortfalls. 
Doing  away  with  those  redundancies  in  a 
concerted  way  is  the  most  effective  cost-
saver  imaginable.  Furthermore  Member 
States can without risk decide to disinvest in 
a  capability  area  either  because  existing 
national capabilities are obsolete and non-
deployable  or  because,  always  on  a 
voluntary basis, participating Member States 
have agreed on specialization among them.  
 
(3) In those capability areas in which they do 
remain active, Member States will be easily 
able to identify opportunities for increased 
pooling and sharing of capabilities, allowing 
them  to  organize  them  in  a  more  cost-
effective  manner  and  increase  operational 
effectiveness.  
 
(4) Pooling & sharing, specialization, and doing 
away  with  redundancies,  will  create 
budgetary  margin  allowing  Member  States 
to  find  partners  to  launch  multinational 
programmes  to  address  the  strategic 
shortfalls  and  generate  new  capabilities, 
including in those areas which go beyond 
the means of any individual nation and thus 
demand  a  combined  initiative  at  the  EU-
level.  
 
The European Defence Agency can and should 
act as the organizer and the secretariat of such a 
process.  A  permanent  capability  generation 
conference  would  thus  also  result  in  a 
permanently relevant EDA.  
 
Permanent Structured Cooperation?  
The question can be asked: does this constitute 
PESCO? What is relevant here is not the label, 
but whether for the Ghent Framework to be 
successful, a mechanism similar to PESCO is 
necessary.  In  all  likelihood,  not  all  Member 
States will be willing from the start to subscribe 
to  a  permanent  and  structured  process  along 
the lines of the Ghent Framework. It is crucial 
that those who are willing can do so within the 
EU and can make use of the EU institutions, 
notably  the  EDA.  That  will  ensure  that 
something  like  a  Permanent  Capability 
Conference  remains  fully  in  line  with  the 
overall development of CSDP, and will easily 
allow  other  Member  States  to  join  at  a  later   4   
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stage, whenever they are able and willing.  
 
To allow that, the Protocol on PESCO annexed 
to  the  Lisbon  Treaty  could  be  activated,  or 
Member States could agree to consider this as 
one of the subgroups established in the EDA. 
As long as the experience and expertise of the 
EDA can be put to use.  
 
Conclusion  
Our  armed  forces  are  simultaneously  facing 
budgetary  austerity  and  increasing  deployment 
for  crisis  management  operations.  In  spite  of 
this, the political circumstances at first sight are 
not  propitious  to  a  new  step  in  European 
defence  cooperation.  With  Member  States 
divided  over  the  military  dimension  of  Libyan 
crisis management, the enthusiasm for pooling 
&  sharing  of  capabilities  may  have  slackened. 
Yet,  operations  in  Libya  have  also  highlighted 
once  again  the  already  well-known  capability 
shortfalls. The solution requires thinking-out-of-
the-box,  of  which  “Ghent”  was  the  starting 
point. Only by aligning their defence efforts and 
collectively  focussing  it  on  those  shortfalls  can 
Europeans remain militarily relevant. And that is 
the first step to develop a truly common CSDP 
strategy,  on  which  debate  should  start 
simultaneously.  
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